Why India needs urgent reform in higher judiciary
FirstpostRecent statements by the Union Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India have attracted a lot of attention. The distinction between what is the basic structure of the Constitution and what is not is debatable, and perhaps an outcome of judicial innovation much like how Public Interest Litigation is also a judicial intervention. It was this basic structure argument that was used to strike down the amendments to the procedure for appointment of judges which were brought in during the first term of the Narendra Modi government. A recent paper by Madhav S Aney, Subhankar Dam and Giovanni Ko titled “Jobs for Justice: Corruption in the Supreme Court of India” provides interesting evidence on this by constructing a data set of Supreme Court of India cases involving the government for 1999-2014: “We find that incentives to pander have a causal effect on judicial decision-making, and they are jointly determined by the importance of the case and whether the judge retires with enough time left in a government’s term to be rewarded with a prestigious job. Given our poor rankings on enforcement of contracts, high litigation costs and lack of clarity on judicial outcomes due to inconsistency on part of judges — our judicial structure is certainly a constraint even on our growth process.