Hong Kong’s Make-or-Break Moment

In October, Catalonians are going to hold a referendum in which voters will be asked to answer this question: “Do you want Catalonia to be an independent country in the form of a republic?” The Spanish government fiercely opposes the referendum and has vowed to use all possible means, including taking over the Catalonian civil service and police, to stop the referendum from being held. To use the words of nationalism scholars, Beijing’s active engagement effectively means embarking on an assimilationist state-building nationalism aimed at incorporating Hong Kong into greater central control on the political, economic, and ideological fronts. Second, Beijing strengthened the role of the central government’s Liaison Office as the “second governing team” in the HKSAR to direct the domestic political affairs of Hong Kong on the spot, such as coordinating the campaigns of pro-Beijing elites at different levels of local elections, from District Council to Legislative Council and chief executive. If “one country, two systems,” “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,” and “high degree of autonomy” were the bywords usually quoted by Beijing’s leaders during the transitional period of 1984-1997 and in the initial years of the HKSAR period, then in recent years the most important keywords adopted by Beijing officials are undoubtedly “powers of the central authorities”. These authorities, as most clearly stated in the controversial “White Paper on the Practice of the One Country, Two Systems Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region,” which was issued in June 2014 by the central government’s State Council, represents Beijing’s “overall jurisdiction over the Hong Kong Special Administration Region” covering both the “powers directly exercised by the central government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” and the “powers that the central government delegates to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government”.