Kargil Revisited: 22 Years Later, Gaps at Strategic Level Still Exist but Being Fixed

Each time we mark Kargil Vijay Diwas, it is imperative that besides the celebration of victory and the remembrance of courage and valour, there should be an honest and intellectual analysis to determine how the lessons learnt apply in the current context. The recapture of that ground by the Indian Army at heights of 16000 to 18000 feet in little over two months with very high attrition rates, amounting to 527 fatalities and 1100 injured, may be counted as one of the most courageous and arduous conventional battles ever fought in high altitude mountains. First, an admission that the Pakistan Army managed strategic surprise due to the entire focus of the Indian security setup being on the militancy and terror in the Valley and south of Pir Panjal. The first steps towards an integrated Ministry of Defence were undertaken with the setting up of the HQ Integrated Defence Staff —but the spirit of the recommendations that included induction of uniformed officers into the MoD remained ignored for long until the current NDA government finally appointed a CDS to head the IDS and an entire Department of Military Affairs under him, with a level of integration of civil and uniformed officials. The KRC had recommended a much higher level of ‘Jointness’ between the three Services, especially after the supposed fiasco of lack of coordination between the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force at the conflict initiation stage.