India's reluctance to play greater role in Afghanistan shows Modi govt unwilling to shed Nehruvian foreign policy just yet

According to the US’ Congressional Research Service, “India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction but New Delhi has not shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defence relationship with Kabul.” According to the US’ Congressional Research Service, which prepares periodic reports for American lawmakers to make informed decisions, “India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction but New Delhi has not shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defence relationship with Kabul.” This assertion is not without reason. Despite lofty claims, the Modi government has largely continued with India’s conventional non-interventionist policy in Afghanistan, as pursued by the previous regime. The Modi government has therefore largely preferred to continue with the UPA’s developmental approach in Afghanistan, and has travelled a little further in terms of strong defence cooperation with the beleaguered Kabul regime. But the logic of Pakistani provocation seems unsatisfactory now in view of the public announcement of “surgical strikes” in 2016 and “aerial strikes” in 2019 against Pakistan after terrorist attacks on Indian territory were found to be planned and engineered by Pakistan-based terrorists: if New Delhi believed that it could manage Pakistan’s retaliation following these strikes, then it could have easily managed assumed Pakistani retaliation against India’s robust military support to the Afghan government. India’s continued reluctance to participate in the stabilisation of Afghanistan by scaling up bilateral military cooperation can also be explained by the sustained influence of the Nehruvian strategic culture in Indian foreign policy bureaucracy that privileges non-alignment and non-intervention, unless vital security stakes are at stake.