Upholding the autonomy of the Election Commission
The HinduOver the course of November and December, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India heard a crucial case about the method by which the Election Commission of India is constituted, and Election Commissioners appointed. It is now commonly accepted that healthy constitutional democracies need what are known as “fourth branch institutions”. Now, it logically follows from the above that “fourth branch institutions” need to be functionally independent from the political executive. Thus, for example, the South African and Kenyan Constitutions have dedicated constitutional provisions for “fourth branch institutions” such as Human Rights Commissions, Election Commissions, and so on, calling these “integrity institutions”, and requiring them to be “independent.” The appointments process for such bodies normally involves multiple stakeholders from different wings of the state. The problem, however, is this: while the Constitution goes to some degree to protect the independence of fourth branch institutions while officials are in office, the power of appointment lies exclusively with the executive.